An Australian philosopher's fascinating argument against God
Anything but worship
This article condenses, then expands upon, Parker Settecase’s recent paper on the book Reality+: virtual worlds and the problems of philosophy, by Australian philosopher and atheist David Chalmers.
A popular and powerful family of arguments for God’s existence is the teleological family. Proponents argue from design in the world to a designer of the world. The name comes from τέλος, an ancient Greek word denoting purpose, among other things.
But Australian atheist philosopher David Chalmers thinks these arguments can be coopted in favour of ‘simulation theories’. Perhaps design in the world indicates not God but a designer one level of reality deeper than us.
On this view, the creator of our world is a natural being capable of accessing and affecting the ‘code’ of our simulation and able to zoom in on any part of it. We might ask whether this simulator counts as God. Functionally, she appears to be almost all-powerful and all-knowing [if it can be said that someone is ‘almost all-powerful’], but she is probably not all-good.
The view appears to provide all the explanatory power of both theism and naturalism, explaining the apparent design of our universe without appeal to the supernatural. Yay for atheism!
Teleological arguments seem to provide equal weight for the conclusion that God exists and the conclusion that the simulator exists.
It is worth noting that this argument does not inherently criticise the plausibility of God’s existence, although Chalmers will do so. It presents an alternative explanation. So it only works if the simulator is at least as plausible an explanation as God is.
Chalmers’ reason for preferring the simulator is intriguing.
Breaking the Symmetry
We come to the point of ‘symmetry’. Teleological arguments seem to provide equal weight for the conclusion that God exists and the conclusion that the simulator exists. Which is the better hypothesis, a Cosmic God or a simulator? Here is Chalmers’ fascinating conclusion:
Even if our simulator is our creator, is all-powerful, is all-knowing, and is all-good, I still don’t think of her as a god. The reason is that the simulator is not worthy of worship. And to be a god in the genuine sense, one must be worthy of worship.
For me, this is helpful in understanding why I’m not religious and why I consider myself an atheist. It turns out that I’m open to the idea of a creator who is close to all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good. I had once thought that this idea is inconsistent with a naturalistic view of the world, but the simulation idea makes it consistent. There remains a more fundamental reason for my atheism, however: I do not think any being is worthy of worship.
The point here goes beyond simulation. Even if the Abrahamic God exists, with all those godlike qualities of perfection, I will respect, admire, and even be in awe of him, but I won’t feel bound to worship him…I don’t think any qualities can make a being worthy of worship. As a result, we never have good reason to worship any being. No possible being is worthy of worship.1
In other words, Chalmers’ reason that a simulator god is more likely than a Cosmic God is not that an omni-competent creator is implausible, but that a Cosmic God would be worthy of worship, which Chalmers thinks is impossible.
“It turns out that I’m open to the idea of a creator who is close to all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good … There remains a more fundamental reason for my atheism, however: I do not think any being is worthy of worship.”
– David Chalmers
It is a fascinating admission. I admire Chalmers’ clarity of thought, and I wish everyone were this open and precise about their religious reservations.
If it is possible that a being be worthy of worship, then Chalmers’ argument fails. And if it is shown to be more likely that a Cosmic God exists than a simulator god, then his objection to teleological arguments falls flat. So we have two questions:
Can a being be worthy of worship?
Are there reasons to prefer a Cosmic God to a simulator god?
1. Worship-Worthiness
It may have surprised you to notice how weakly Chalmers states his crucial premise and how strongly he states his conclusion.
Chalmers goes straight from “I don’t think any qualities can make a being worthy of worship” and “I won’t feel bound to worship him” to “No possible being is worthy of worship.” He seems to have skipped the process of actually arguing for this conclusion. Sometimes philosophers do strange philosophy.
In the following paragraph, Chalmers does finish with the crucial question: “What could make a being worthy of worship, and why?” Unfortunately, he makes no attempt to answer it.
But it is tempting to turn the question around. Chalmers’ objection is based purely on his intuition and, as far as I can tell, he provides no reason why no quality can make a being worship of worship. So we might ask why we should take this intuition seriously, especially when the vast majority of people in history and around the world have believed that certain properties make a being worthy of worship.
Why think that no being is worthy of worship, or that no property could make a being worthy of worship? I have found many aspects of the Christian faith unintuitive, but never the idea that we ought to worship an all-powerful, all-knowing being who is entirely good and present everywhere.
Add to this the Christian notion that the omni-competent God humbled himself in the person of the Son, endured the crushing weight of our slavery to sin, suffered the full punishment for our moral failure, made the blood sacrifice which was rightly ours and paid the immeasurable debt we could never afford, so that we might be saved and united to Him.
Surely that Being is worthy of worship.
I have found many aspects of the Christian faith unintuitive, but never the idea that we ought to worship an all-powerful, all-knowing being who is entirely good and present everywhere.
One objection, provided by Chalmers, is that “Any God that demands our worship doesn’t deserve it.” This has a common sense appeal, and I explored the intuition recently.
But there is an element of disappointing dismissiveness to Chalmers’ blunt assertion that no possible being is worthy of worship.
In fact, Chalmers seems poorly positioned to answer his own questions. He confidently asserts, “Even if the Abrahamic God exists, with all those godlike qualities of perfection, I will respect, admire, and even be in awe of him, but I won’t feel bound to worship him.” But we might ask how Chalmers, despite proudly asserting that he has never apprehended God, knows that he would not worship a Cosmic God if he met one.
Our culture seems to have decided that worshipping God means abandoning joy and fulfilment either to fall forever on one’s face before Him or to sing organ-accompanied hymns for all eternity.
A fascinating element of Chalmers’ assertion is that he admits that such a God would be worthy of respect, admiration and awe, but sharply distinguishes these from worship. Surely at least to some extent a person is due respect, admiration and awe in proportion to a person’s power, knowledge and goodness? If God is infinitely powerful, knowledgable and good, then perhaps he is infinitely worthy of respect, admiration and awe.
Chalmers’ objection then amounts to this: even if he met a God who was worthy of infinite respect, admiration and awe, of course he would never worship Him. Again we must ask, why not?
The problem seems to be a shallow perception of ‘worship’, for which Chalmers should be forgiven. Our culture seems to have decided that worshipping God means abandoning joy and fulfilment either to fall forever on one’s face before Him or to sing organ-accompanied hymns for all eternity.
The Christian’s whole life is an act of worship. It is clear that our God is worthy; the wonder is how he makes us worthy of coming to him in worship.
But of course we worship God not only by singing (which is, for the record, among life’s great joys), but also by working, creating, philosophising, playing football, kneeling, loving one another and countless other acts. The pictures of eternal singing in the book of Revelation are surely images of the great joy God’s people experience in his presence and their great reverence for him.
Paul wrote to the Christians in Rome, “I urge you, brothers and sisters, in view of God’s mercy, to offer your bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and pleasing to God – this is your true and proper worship.” (12:1) The Christian’s whole life is an act of worship. It is clear that our God is worthy; the wonder is how he makes us worthy of coming to him in worship.
2. Simulator vs Cosmic God
Don’t worry, this one’s quick.
It is worth briefly noting a number of philosophical reasons for preferring a Cosmic God over a simulator god. Doubtless there are more, and I would love to expand each of these, but I suspect you have things to do. The following are issues for a simulator God, but not a Cosmic God.
What grounds universal moral facts, like ‘it is always wrong to torture babies’?
What affords humans special moral status?
What grounds objective moral duties?
Why expect sims to possess genuine moral knowledge?
How could a simulator generate the ‘qualia’ of human consciousness? (Qualia being the what-it-is-like-ness of subjective conscious experience)
The simulator explains our origin, but not the origin of the universe.
The basic observation is that the numerous philosophical problems addressed by theism are mostly not solved by a simulator god, but merely pushed back one level of reality.
In fact, we can raise the problem of teleology itself in reference to the simulation. How did the simulator, who possesses attributes and technologies which clearly indicate design, come to exist?
Not only are a number of major philosophical problems enhanced by Chalmers’ objection; it appears that the problem of teleology itself is unsolved. These problems give us a number of significant reasons to prefer the hypothesis of a Cosmic God.
Questions for the Comments
Do you think a Cosmic God would be/is worthy of worship?
What could make a being worthy of worship, and why?
David Chalmers, Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 2022), 144.
Nice piece, Eliot, and good on you for reading all of Reality+, a book that's probably longer than it needs to be (I suppose that's the "+" part).
I might be dense, but David Chalmers's argument seems to beg the question. Why believe that the mind is basically a computer and can be reduced to electrical impulses?
Stimulating piece Eliot!
"Worthy are you, our Lord and God,
to receive glory and honour and power,
*for* you created all things,
and by your will they existed and were created.”